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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by defendant, U.S. Energy Corp.,
demonstrates that the court of appeals decision conflicts with prior decisions of this
Court in approving an award of punitive damages without any finding of tort liability,
without a prior finding of punitive damage liability, and despite unlawful introduction of
wealth evidence. (Pet. 6-13.) The court of appeals decision also departs from prior cases
of this Court by awarding attorney fees for all of plaintiffs' claims, without any reduction
or apportionment for unsuccessful claims or claims unrelated to U.S. Energy's
counterclaim, which was found to be the sole basis for the fee award. (Pet. 13-16.)
Plaintiffs' opposition brief fails to address the specific points established in the
petition, focusing instead on marshaling of evidence and waiver arguments that are
unrelated to the issues presented. The purpose of this Reply Brief is to focus the Court
back on the issues presented, and to demonstrate more specifically how the court of
appeals decision on punitive damages and attorney fees conflicts with prior decisions of
this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION CONFLICTS WITH
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT REGARDING ESSENTIAL
CONDITIONS FOR AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

Plaintiffs attempt to divert attention from the issues actually raised by U.S. Energy
in its petition to this Court. (Opp. Br. 7-9.) U.S. Energy does not here challenge any
jury instruction or the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. Rather, the issues
raised on this petition arc purely legal: 1) Can punitive damages be awarded in the

absence of any tort liability? 2) Can punitive damages be awarded without any prior
finding of punitive damage liability; i.e., a finding, regardless of sufficiency of evidence,
that U.S. Energy engaged in willful and malicious conduct? 3) Can punitive damages be
awarded when illegal wealth evidence was introduced, even without objection, during
the compensatory damage phase of the trial? On those legal issues, marshaling of
evidence is irrelevant.1
As more fully set forth in the petition, those issues were decided contrary to this
Court's prior decisions, or present matters of first impression. The court of appeals
sidestepped the first issue, affirming the verdict of punitive damages while conceding
that it was "unable to determine," and had "no way of knowing," whether the verdict was
based on tort or contract. 383 U.A.R. at 11, *\\ 19, and 12,1f 25. That ruling squarely
conflicts with this Court's decision in Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161,
1167 (Utah 1983), holding that a "verdict for punitive damages cannot be sustained
[when] the record does not show an award of compensatory damages in tort to which
such punitive damages could be ascribed." (Emp. added.) Plaintiffs make no effort to
distinguish the Warnick case or its undisputed statement of the law.

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the real issues by arguing that "the bulk" of the court of appeals
opinion dealt with the marshaling requirement and waiver. (Opp. Br. 6.) However, that is not accurate.
In a minor, secondary argument to the court of appeals, U.S. Energy asserted the absence of any evidence
to support an award of punitive damages. That argument rendered marshaling of evidence unnecessary
because nonexistent evidence cannot be "marshaled." The court of appeals' ruling on that argument is
immaterial because U.S. Energy has abandoned that argument for purposes of its petition to this Court.
The marshaling argument pertains only to sufficiency of evidence; marshaling of evidence has nothing to
do with the issues raised here, such as the absence of any tort basis for punitive damages at all.

On the second issue, plaintiffs simply parrot the court of appeals ruling that
punitive damages can be awarded without a prior finding of punitive damage liability
when the defendant does not ^'object to the procedure." (Opp. Br. 8-9.) See 383 U.A.R.
at 10, U 15. However, we are talking about more than mere procedure. U.C.A. § 78-18-1
absolutely prohibits an award of punitive damages without a prior finding of punitive
conduct, established by clear and convincing evidence. This Court has never addressed
the issue of whether that statutory mandate can be waived, presenting here an issue of
first impression. This Court has authority to review a manifest violation of statute, even
though not raised in the trial court. (Pet. 11.) Moreover, the court of appeals'
characterization of the issue as one of mere procedure contradicts this Court's holding in
Cook Associates, Inc. v. War nick, supra, which places "the burden of requesting special
verdicts" squarely on the plaintiff. 664 P.2d at 1168. It is the plaintiffs, here, who had
the obligation to establish punitive liability in the first verdict form. That waiver, by
plaintiffs, cannot be excused by a perceived waiver in the second verdict form when the
jury should never have received a second verdict form.2
The third issue is one of first impression: Can the statutory mandate of section
78-18-1(2), absolutely prohibiting wealth evidence during the compensatory damage
phase of trial, be waived by inadvertent failure to object? Case law in analogous

2

The court of appeals decision also conflicts with Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817
P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991), and other cases that expressly require bifurcated consideration of punitive
damages and, thereby, implicitly preclude consideration of punitive damages without a prior finding of
punitive liability. The court of appeals merely "assumed" a finding of punitive liability from the verdict
of punitive damages. 383 U.A.R. at 10, If 16. However, such a procedure simply "skips" the essential
finding of liability, contrary to the law established by this Court.

contexts indicates that it cannot be waived. This Court can review the issue pursuant to
Rule 103(d), permitting review of "plain error."
POINT II:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AWARDING
UNRESTRICTED ATTORNEY FEES IS CONTRARY TO THIS
COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS.

Assuming, for purposes of this argument, that plaintiffs are entitled to some
attorney fees under the lease agreement, the court of appeals decision awarding plaintiffs
all their fees for aU_ work on all_claims and defenses is plainly contrary to this Court's
prior decisions. As set forth in the petition, in a case involving multiple contract and tort
claims and counterclaims, the party requesting fees must allocate fees among the various
claims and between successful and unsuccessful claims. (Pet. 13-14.) Plaintiffs made no
allocation. The court of appeals nonetheless awarded all fees on the basis that plaintiffs
prevailed on defendant's contract counterclaim alone. 383 U.A.R. at 11, ^f 20.
This decision is plainly contrary to this Court's prior decisions in Cottonwood
Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992); Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah
1998); and Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998), which all require a
claimant to apportion requested fees among contract and noncontract claims, and
successful and unsuccessful claims. Absent such an apportionment, the trial court, or a
reviewing court, has no way of knowing whether the fee amount requested is reasonable.
See Foote, supra, at 55 ("Even a cursory look at counsel's affidavit reveals counsel's
failure to properly categorize the fee request and raises questions about the
reasonableness of the fees . . . .''); Valcarce, supra, at 318 O'trial court. . . may not award

wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate
claims").
Here, plaintiffs' award should have been limited to the fees actually related to
prevailing on defendant's counterclaim. For example, plaintiffs' tort claims for fraud
and infliction of emotional distress are unrelated to defendant's counterclaim for an
accounting of receipts and expenditures. Plaintiffs should not be awarded unlimited
attorney fees for a multitude of contract and tort claims and defenses when the actual
basis for the verdict cannot be determined, and the only basis for fees is the contract
counterclaim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted this /&

day of March, 2000.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

By:
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Merrill F. Nelson
and
Kenneth A.B. Roberts, Jr.
Kenneth A. Roberts, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant-Petitioner
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